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Abstract
This paper investigates the gold bloc operated between France, the Nether-
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fect of military-political developments in Germany and Italy on the sustainability
of the gold bloc between its members. Juxtaposed is the view of leading political
scientists, such as Henry Kissinger, who see impending war in Europe as deeply
and adversely affecting psychology in Europe, and what may be called the stan-
dard economists view that sees the demise of the gold bloc as being caused almost
exclusively by economic factors. Developing concepts of external and internal
inconsistency of the gold bloc, this investigation concludes that both economic
and military-political developments played important roles in destroying the last
vestiges of the gold standard.
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DID IMPENDING WAR IN EUROPE HELP DESTROY THE GOLD BLOC IN 
1936? AN INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY HYPOTHISIS 
 
We suggest a reinterpretation of the forces that forced France off the gold standard in 
September 1936. Rather than originating in the purely economic sphere we argue that the 
reemergence of Germany as a military power is also a likely cause. While it is true that 
France in the mid-1930s faced a contradiction between reflation of the economy through 
monetary expansion (to create jobs) and continued adherence to the gold standard; likewise 
there was a contradiction between increased spending on rearmament (to maintain national 
security) and maintenance of the gold standard. Moreover, shocks to confidence in a 
monetary system may originate from outside the purely economic sphere, especially when 
war with a larger neighbor is in prospect.  Indeed, referring to the breakdown of the classical 
gold standard a generation earlier, Brown (1940) wrote: “During the late spring and early 
summer of 1914 the shadow of the approaching conflict in Europe was cast over the world’s 
money markets” (page7). And in the period in which we are interested an authority on the 
history of interest rates writes “throughout the 1930’s France struggled unsuccessfully to 
defend the franc in the face of world-wide depression and the looming prospect of war” 
(Homer, 1963, page 431. Italics added). We contend that it is legitimate therefore to reopen 
enquiry into the question of what destroyed the gold bloc - the last vestige of the 
international gold standard - three years before the outbreak of World War II. In particular, 
was it only economic forces, or, did the specter of war in Europe play an accompanying 
role? 
 
In 1925 the international gold standard was reconstituted with its previous major players 
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rejoining.  As various investigations have shown, it was destroyed in both the UK and the 
USA by adverse economic and financial circumstances stemming from the Great 
Depression, and this is also true of Germany (Eichengreen, 1992, Hallwood, MacDonald 
and Marsh, 1996, 1997 and 2000).  As the fourth great player, France, abandoned the gold 
standard in September 1936, only three-and-one-half years after the USA, earlier 
investigations of this event have also focused on economic causes (Eichengreen, 1992, 
Hogg, 1987)1.  However, we believe that a narrow economic approach to the French 
suspension misses some important causes as it does not take into account the concurrent 
transformation of the European military-political order which was hugely to the 
disadvantage of France.   
 
In this paper we distinguish between the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ inconsistency of the 
gold bloc regime.2  Previous economic analyses of the collapse of the gold bloc has 
emphasised its external inconsistency.  That is, continued adherence to gold rendered the 
gold bloc countries uncompetitive, with worsening current accounts and falling gold 
reserves, ultimately they broke under the tension and abandoned gold (see for example, 
Hautcoeur, 1997).3  The internal inconsistency argument presented here is that there was an 
asymmetric threat from the reemergence of Germany as a military force, and this adversely 
impacted France more than it did the other gold bloc members.  On this assumption, the 
                     
1
 Hogg (1987) concluded: “Having decided to stick to gold, the bourgeois governments of the four 
countries studied here at the same time refused to face the logical alternative – deflation.  This was 
primarily due to the political factors…in general there was not actual money deflation…Opposition to the 
continuation of the current parity usually came from isolated academics and sometimes export 
groups”(Page 208). 
2
 The four main members of the gold bloc were Belgium, France, Netherlands and Switzerland. Other original 
members, Italy, Poland, Danzig and Czechoslovakia all soon moved to foreign exchange controls. 
3
 Beaudry and Portier (2002), argue that over-valuation of the French franc was not a major factor causing 
the Great Depression in France because international trade was too small a percentage of GDP (page 86).  
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gold bloc broke under the strain of gold losses from France, in some measure to other gold 
bloc countries.  Ultimately the French could not sustain these gold losses and abandoned 
gold.  The remaining countries, Switzerland and Netherlands simply followed suit after the 
bloc’s major player had abandoned gold.  
 
We proceed as follows: Section 1 sets out the international military-political context in 
which the franc was devalued.  Section 2 discusses the economic context.  Section 3 extends 
the discussion of the economic context with a statistical investigation of the internal 
consistency of the gold-bloc’s exchange rate regime. We find that exchange rate 
commitments between the members were not viewed in financial markets as being 
consistent with one another – implying that the gold bloc was not a credible target zone.  An 
implication of this is that asymmetric shocks stemming from the military-political context 
were all the more potent. Section 4 discusses how short- and long-term interest rate behavior 
in the gold bloc-four relates to our thesis of asymmetric military-political shocks playing a 
role in its destruction.  We find some support for the notion that France’s commitment to 
gold was adversely affected by Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia, as well as Germany’s 
reoccupation of the Rhineland.  Section 5 examines post-gold bloc capital flows.  It is 
pointed out that capital that had left Netherlands and Switzerland in the run up to their 
abandonment of gold, returned to these countries during 1937 - as it had to Belgium 
following its devaluation in March-April 1935.  However, neither foreign capital nor French 
capital returned to France during the same year.  This set of observations is consistent with 
the asymmetric military-political shock hypothesis: in financial markets German 
remilitarization was seen as more of a problem for France than for the other gold bloc 
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members. Section 6 concludes. 
 
Section 1: The international military-political context 
The Treaty of Versailles ending the First World War fell far short of satisfying France's 
national security needs (Kissinger, 1994).  In the 1920s, as a counter-weight to Germany the 
French had wanted a buffer state and alliances, or, border guarantees with the USA and the 
UK.4  But instead of a buffer state the French got only a demilitarized Rhineland (under 
articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty, reaffirmed by Germany under the Locarno Treaty of 1925); 
instead of alliances with the major powers, the USA chose what amounted to isolationism, 
and the British offered only ‘diplomatic cooperation’ (Kissinger, 1994, p 253).  Of this 
disastrous outcome for French national security, France's victorious military leader, Marshal 
Foch, famously said of the Treaty of Versailles "This is not peace; it is an armistice for 
twenty years".5   
 
French diplomacy was required to find other national security solutions; none of them, even 
taken together, turned out to be sufficient. These were collective security through the 
League of Nations, international guarantee of her borders with Germany (under Locarno), 
alliances with the new states of Eastern Europe, an attempted alliance with Mussolini's Italy, 
a political alliance with the Soviet Union and continuing overtures to Britain. 
 
 Henry Kissinger writes that France was "in a truly tragic position...it no longer had 
                     
    4
. The Treaty of Guarantee of July 1919 between France, the UK and the USA was not approved in the US 
Senate and was thereby void. 
 5
. Quoted by Henry Kissinger (1994), page 250. 
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confidence in its ability to protect even its own frontiers against a defeated enemy" (1994, 
page 228). 6  The influence on the French state of mind was predictable; Kissinger writes of 
"demoralization" (p 228), of being "obsessively fearful of another round of [German] 
conquest" (p. 233), of France being a "depleted country" (p. 235), and that France "could not 
fight another traditional war" (p. 235). 
 
We pick out three foreign military-political developments that could have affected sentiment 
in France against the franc and to which we refer later.  These were 
 
1. March 16, 1935, Germany reintroduces conscription, which was against the 
Versailles Treaty;  
2. October 1935, Italy invades Abyssinia - a foreign policy disaster for France;  
3. March 7, 1936, Germany reoccupies the Rhineland, which was against the Versailles 
Treaty and Locarno Pact, and was a military and another foreign policy disaster for 
France. 
 
William Shirer writes of the significance of German conscription: "the shackles of 
Versailles, symbol of Germany's defeat and humiliation, had been torn off" (1959, p. 391).  
This clearly was an important step in the rise of the Germany's military threat against 
France. 
 
Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 was a debacle for French foreign policy. 
In the vain hope of drawing up an alliance with Italy against Germany, France had acted to 
thwart League of Nation's sanctions against Italy - imposed because of the latter's invasion.  
Shirer sums up this failure of French foreign policy: "Because of its hesitations and the 
devious policies of [Prime Minister] Laval, the French government had lost all: Italy as an 
                     
     6
.  For an eyewitness view of French psychology in the 1920s see Shirer (1969, chapter 10). 
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ally against Germany, the military backing of Russia, Great Britain as a close partner, the 
League of Nations as a potential force in halting aggression" (Shirer, 1969, p. 250).  The 
upshot was a blow to the ruling, financially orthodox, Radical Party as Premier Laval was 
forced to resign, and a boost to the leftist the Popular Front.   
 
Most disastrous of all for French security, however, was the German reoccupation of the 
Rhineland in March 1936.  This at once potentially brought German military forces to the 
French frontier and, by creating a western wall of steel virtually destroyed French foreign 
policy in Eastern Europe - both because French land forces were blocked and the East 
Europeans, realizing this, began to look elsewhere for their own security.  Of the Rhineland 
invasion Shirer writes "The whole structure of European peace and security set up in 1919 
collapsed" (1969, p 281). 
 
What effect did these foreign policy set backs, occurring within the space of just twelve 
months, have upon French thinking in the economic and financial spheres?  Importantly 
capital began to flee France. The Bank of France confirmed that outflow of capital from 
France was largely the result of “large exports of French capital”7, April 1936 being an 
especially bad month.  This is the month immediately following German reoccupation of the 
Rhineland.8  
                     
7
 Annual Report of the Bank of France, page 309 in Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1937. 
8
 The Federal Reserve Bulletin reported that: “At the end of September 1936 short-term balances held by 
foreigners in the US amounted to $1,460,000,000, an increase of nearly $1,000,000,000 since the end of 
1933.  … French, Dutch and Swiss balances on September 30th, 1936, totaled $390,000,000, the bulk of 
which was acquired since the end of 1933.  This inward movement of funds was associated to an important 
degree with financial crises in the gold-bloc countries, though also influenced to some extent by the 
unsettled international situation in Europe.  While readjustment of currencies has been followed by some 
return of hoarded funds and capital from London, uncertainties abroad continue and gold-bloc balances in 
the US have been little reduced since September” (Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 1936, page 938). 
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Paul Einzig (1937) reports a run on the banks in north and north eastern France in March 
1936 so linking financial disturbances in France to German military events.  Einzig also 
reports wealthy French streaming across the English Channel to London carrying currency 
and gold for deposit in British banks which were so swamped that they ran out of safe 
deposit boxes.  
 
It is possible to argue therefore that military-political developments in Germany and Italy, 
combined with diplomatic failures to combat them, undermined the confidence of the 
French not so much in the franc as in the survival of France itself.  This is especially so as 
surely more people than just Pierre Flandin, the Foreign Minister in March 1936, had the 
prescience to think that "once Germany had fortified the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia would 
be lost and that, soon after, general war would become unavoidable" (quoted by Kissinger, 
1994, page 305). 
 
 Military developments in Germany also had clear budgetary implications in France.  Einzig 
(1937) suggests that the French government refused to finance a general mobilization called 
for by the French military because of its cost.  The implication for the budget deficit of the 
Rhineland reoccupation surely could not have been lost on those people holding liquid 
capital, for shortly after the new government came to power military spending was indeed 
increased - by F14 billion (a figure equal to about one-quarter of French gold reserves).9 
 
                                                             
 
    9
. See Shirer (1969) page 308. 
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The Dutch central bank in early-1936 made a very clear statement on the adverse budgetary 
implications of European military-political events: 
 
“The past year [1935] was a period of confusion and contradiction. While it was 
generally realized in theory that nothing but an improvement of international relations 
could bring about world recovery, it seemed impossible to put the theory into 
practice.  Political relations showed increasing tension.  Lack of confidence and fear 
of war were felt to an increasing extent.  In all countries measures for stronger 
armaments were adopted.  The emergence of storm centers in various parts of the 
world led even those countries whose peaceful intensions were beyond question to 
increase their military defenses.  
“The resulting heavy demand for raw materials and labor for war industries can 
hardly be considered a factor of permanent prosperity.  Unproductive expenditures of 
this kind aggravate still further the already heavy burden of Government indebtedness 
and taxation; even if they are met in the first place wholly or in part out of loan 
issues, they constitute fresh obligations against the future” (Annual Report of the 
Netherlands Bank, 1935-36).10 
 
Thus, when one considers the international political position of France in the spring of 1936 
there is a clear inconsistency between crumbling confidence in national security and a strong 
franc. This inconsistency should be set side-by-side with the oft stated inconsistency 
between reflation, say, on the lines of the American New Deal, and a strong franc - an 
                     
 
10
 Page 564 in Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1936). 
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argument to which we now turn. 
 
Section 2:  Economic factors 
We favor understanding the international gold standard in terms of the monetary approach to 
the balance of payments (see, e.g., Eichengreen, and Flandreau, 1996, McCloskey and 
Zecher, 1976, Dornbusch, 1973, or Johnson and Frenkel, 1976). This analysis is implicit in 
Eichengreen’s (1992) authoritative economic study of the gold bloc. In this view monetary 
dis-hoarding and balance and payments deficits are occasioned by excessive rates of 
domestic credit expansion.  The main problem for the French following the devaluations of 
the pound and dollar in, respectively, September 1931 and March 1933, was that higher 
prices in the sterling and dollar areas encouraged hoarding in these which, evidently, was 
not matched by sufficient domestic credit expansion as gold flowed to them through balance 
of payments surpluses from the gold bloc countries.  
As the gold bloc countries had ruled out foreign exchange controls, payments equilibrium 
could be restored only under one (or a combination) of two circumstances. Either their price 
levels had to fall sufficiently to cheapen their exports so much as to end the desire to hoard 
in the sterling and dollar areas; or the gold bloc countries ended the international price level 
disparity by themselves devaluing - so ending their desire to dis-hoard.  However, all 
leading political parties in France were set against devaluation - mainly because of the fear 
that it would lead to a repeat of the inflation suffered in the 1920s. 
 
Unfortunately, the process of price-deflation in the gold bloc-four was drawn out and at a 
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huge cost in terms of unemployment.11  The Bank of France staunchly defended the franc 
with tight money. Indeed, from 1931 the French real money base increased least among the 
four gold bloc countries.  Successive deflationary packages were implemented (the last of 
them in July and November 1935).  However, resistance to deflation grew, and the fall of 
the Laval government in January 1936 - as mentioned above over foreign policy issues, 
marked the end of French tolerance of deflationary policies.  
 
What of a policy of reflation instead of deflation? Under French monetary conditions - a 
small government bond market and commercial banks already stuffed with Treasury bills, 
increased government spending required monetization.  But the latter also ran into the logic 
of money in an open economy: excessive domestic credit expansion would weaken the 
balance of payments and serve further to reduce already dwindling gold and foreign 
exchange reserves. 
 
With French public wearied of the Depression but still set against devaluation they 
increasingly turned to the Popular Front which stood for the contradictory policy of 
reflation without devaluation (Eichengreen, 1992).  With unemployment so high one may 
wonder why the French public was so resolved against devaluation.  Shepherd explains 
that "in continental Europe, the distinction is seldom drawn in the popular mind between 
devaluation and inflation" (1936, page 199). The Popular Front’s prospective and actual 
victory in the General Election of April/May 1936 set the stage for a run on the franc 
which lasted from March to September (with only with an interruption in July). But, it 
                     
11
 See Eichengreen (1992) chapter 12 for a description of the prolonged Depression in France. 
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should be noted, the supposed effects of the Popular Front are confounded with the 
asymmetric military–political shock hypothesis put forward here. 
Section III: Exchange Rate Behavior 
We begin our analysis of the gold bloc and its collapse with a consideration of how 
soundly the four members were viewed in financial markets as being wedded to the gold 
standard.  If a country is thought by financial markets to be securely tied to gold its 
exchange rate should be mean reverting (Krugman, 1991, Bertola and Svensson, 1993).  
That is, if an exchange rate is near either of the gold points, especially the gold export 
point where the currency is weak, it should tend to revert toward the center of the band, 
rather than to bump along one of its edges. To test for mean reversion of gold bloc 
exchange rates we use the variance ratio test, originally proposed in the economics 
literature by Cochrane (1988) and previously used to test for mean reversion of exchange 
rates under the classical gold standard by Hallwood, MacDonald and Marsh, 1996.12   
The variance ratio test is potentially a powerful way of testing for the univariate mean-
reverting properties of a series because it can capture potential long autocorrelations 
which are unlikely to be captured in standard Dickey Fuller type tests, and which can be 
important in producing mean reversion. Under the null hypothesis that a variable, such as 
the exchange rate, follows a random walk, the variance of the kth difference should equal 
k times the first difference. That is,  
   Var q q kVar q qt t k t t( ) ( ).− = −− −1  
On rearranging this expression we have:       
                     
12
 Exchange rate data abstracted from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), Banking 
and Monetary Statistics, Washington DC. 
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               V k Var q q Var q qk t t k t t= − − =− − −( / ).[( ( )).( ( )) ] ,1 11 1    
where Vk denotes the variance ratio, based on lag k. So a finding that an estimated value 
of Vk equals unity would imply that the exchange rate follows a random walk. However, 
if Vk turns out to be less than unity this would imply that the exchange rate was stationary 
and mean-reverting. The intuition for this is straightforward – if the underlying process 
driving the real exchange rate is mean- reverting, the variance of the series would 
decrease as k becomes larger. Alternatively, if Vk turns out to be greater than one, the  
exchange rate would exhibit ‘super-persistence’    
For the Classical and inter-war gold standard periods, exchange rates do appear to be 
strongly mean-reverting, thereby supporting the view that these gold standard episodes 
were credible (see, for example, Hallwood MacDonald and Marsh (1996) and secure on 
gold.   
The results of our variance ratio test for the gold bloc period are reported in Table 1, for 
lag lengths k=2 through to K =30. In sum, and in contrast to the results reported for other 
gold standard periods, the results here show no sign of exchange rate mean reversion for 
any of the four currencies against each other.  The results are read in the following way. 
For each currency we present two variants of the variance ratio test – V1 and V2. The 
former is calculated using a small sample correction, which is likely to be important in 
the current application, whereas the latter is not. The column headings K=2 to K=30 
denote the lag lengths (number of months) used to calculate the variance ratio test. 
Numbers in parenthesis denote the standard error. The results are unambiguous since all  
apart from one cell entry (V2 and K=30 for the Belgian franc) exhibit super persistence 
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and an absence of mean reversion. As we have said these results are very different to 
other gold standard experiences and we conclude from this that  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Variance ratio test for mean reversion of gold bloc exchange rates 
Lag Length 
 
K=2 K=5 K=10 K=30 
Currency     
V1 Be 
Franc 
1.73 3.21 4.48 2.57 
 (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
V2 Be 
Franc 
1.52 2.70 3.37 0.63 
 (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.52) 
V1 Fr 
Franc 
1.88 1.81 2.23 4.22 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.00) 
V2 Fr 
Franc 
1.69 1.41 1.44 1.34 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) 
V1 Sw 
Franc 
1.68 1.59 1.24 3.50 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.21) (0.00) 
V2 Sw 
Franc 
1.52 1.24 1.95 1.15 
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 (0.13) (0.21) (0.05) (0.25) 
V1 Ne 
Guilder 
1.52 2.09 2.72 4.08 
 (0.13) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) 
V2 Ne 
Guilder 
1.80 1.79 2.09 1.88 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) 
Notes: V1 Denotes the variance ratio calculated with a finite sample correction and V2 is 
the corresponding ratio without such a correction (see Wright, 2000). Numbers in 
parenthesis are heteroscedasticty robust p-values.  
  
the gold bloc was never securely based on gold.  It was, therefore, vulnerable to both 
external inconsistency of price levels with its trade partners/rivals and to asymmetric 
military-political shocks originating in Germany and Italy.  That is, this analysis supports 
both the external inconsistency argument of, inter alia, Eichengreen (1992), and our 
internal inconsistency hypothesis. Interestingly, Ritschl and Wolf (2003) throw some 
light as to why gold bloc countries’ cross exchange rates were not strongly mean 
reverting.  Their evidence is that the gold bloc members were not particularly well trade-
integrated with each other.  Specifically, that 1928 trade patterns did not ‘predict’ 
membership of the gold bloc, while they did so for the Reichsmark bloc and the sterling 
bloc which were both formed after sterling was knocked off gold in September 1931. We 
move on to see whether internal inconsistency was indeed a factor in causing the collapse 
of the gold bloc.  
Section 4: Interest rates 
We use Switzerland as a ‘base’ country as it was much less likely to become embroiled in 
a new world war than was France.  Indeed, “Switzerland enjoyed unusual political and 
economic stability for almost a century and a half. Beleaguered but untouched by two 
world wars, the small nation became a symbol of neutrality and a safe haven for refugee 
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capital” (Homer, 1963, page 470). Thus, we assume that changes in French interest rates 
relative to Swiss rates captures at least some of the asymmetric shock of German 
remilitarization on the internal coherence of the gold bloc 
Using 12 month moving averages it cannot be said for the period 1928(11) to 1936(12) 
that there is a “normal” level of short-French interest rates – at least as measured by the 
available data, which is for private discount rates.13  They were high at the beginning of 
the period, reflecting French franc weakness soon after (de facto) rejoining the gold 
standard – something that is supported by the revelation of strong devaluation 
expectations against the French franc held in foreign exchange markets as shown in 
Hallwood, MacDonald and Marsh (1996). French interest rates fell back in the middle 
months of our data period as foreign exchange speculation moved first against the pound 
sterling – pushing it off gold in September 1931 - followed by speculation against the US 
dollar, which fell in March 1933 (see Hallwood, MacDonald and Marsh, 1997, 2000). 
However, French short-term interest rates climbed sharply from spring 1935 – concurrent 
with the Belgian banking crisis and the severely deteriorating international political 
situation discussed above.  They remained high thereafter. 
To pick out the effect of military-political events on the internal consistency of the gold 
bloc we turn to a discussion of:  
a) Behavior of short-term interest rates of other gold bloc countries against France.  From 
the theory of uncovered interest rate parity, a rise in French short term interest  rates 
relative to those of another member indicates expected depreciation of the French franc.  
                     
13
 Short term interest rate data for France, the Netherlands and Switzerland collected from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), Banking and Monetary Statistics, Washington DC. 
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b) Yield gap analysis – a  rise in short term rates relative to long rates generally indicates 
worsening economic conditions14. 
a) Short-term interest rates in the gold bloc 
Figure 1 shows the short-term interest rate spread (private discount rates).  Negative 
values indicate higher French short-term rates. The figure shows quite convincingly that 
French short-term interest rates rose sharply compared with those of Belgium and 
Switzerland in the second quarter of 1935 shortly following Germany’s reintroduction of 
conscription in the March of that year. French short-term rates where to remain higher 
than those of the other countries through to the end of the gold bloc in September 
1936.Also shown is that the interest rate differential moved even more sharply against 
France in the fourth quarter of 1935 – at the time of Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia; and 
again in the second quarter of 1936, following Germany’s reoccupation of the Rhineland 
in March. Indeed, the Federal Reserve (Bulletin, July 1936) explicitly linked short-term 
capital flows to the US with the Abyssinian situation.15   
                     
14
 France: long bond, 3 percent irredeemable government bond; the Netherlands: 2.5-3 percent 
irredeemable government bond; Switzerland: State and Federal 3.5 percent railways bond. Data collected 
from League of Nations Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
15
 Thus, “When the tension in Europe over the Ethiopian situation reached a critical point last autumn 
[1935], there was a heavy transfer of funds from London to New York, and other times international 
political developments abroad appear to have stimulated the flow of capital”, (Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
July, 1936, page 511). The Swiss National Bank in its Annual Report for 1935 also linked the Abyssinian 
situation with interest rate developments.  Thus, “Economic sanctions decreed by the League of Nations 
against Italy and made effective on November 18th, 1935, created a new barrier to international trade” 
(Annual Report reprinted in Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1935, page 344).  These last two quotations 
from central bank reports make a clear link between the Abyssinia invasion, constrained international trade, 
and speculation against the French franc – occurring in the same month as the League of Nations sanctions 
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Figure 1: Short-term interest rate (private discount rates) spreads of Netherlands, 
Belgium and Switzerland compared with France 
 
b) Yield gaps 
One way to indicate the effect of German remilitarization on the internal consistency of 
the gold bloc is to compare French and Swiss interest rate gaps (long- minus short-
rates)16. A rise in the short-term interest rate relative to the long rate is often taken as a 
sign of economic and/or financial weakness (Mishkin, 1995, and references there in, 
Dotsey, 1998). Under a pegged exchange rate regime such as the gold standard, a rise in 
short-term interest rates indicates a lack of trust in the stability of the value in foreign 
currency of short-dated securities. Lower interest rates on long-term securi ties, or, at least 
a rise in short rates relative to long rates, may indicate the expectation of a long-term 
                     
16
 French yield curve: 3% irredeemable government bonds minus one month private discount rate.  Swiss 
yield curve: 3.5% federal and state railway bonds less one month private discount rate.  Source: League of 
Nations, various issues. 
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weakening in the real economy. Mishkin (1995, page 16), using data for five countries,17 
finds positive relationships between changes in the yield curve and future rates of real 
economic activity.  That is, a steeper yield curve is associated with increased levels of 
economic activity, and a flattening of it with reduced activity. In particular, a yield curve 
flattening may occur with a combination of a rise in short-term interest rates and a 
negative shock to expected real economic activity.18 We argue that military-political 
shocks (emanating from Germany) on France would indeed cause short-term interest 
rates to rise relative to long-rates. In 1936 French short-term interest rates  did rise – to 
stem a capital outflow, while it is arguable that prospects for the French real economy 
would also have been adversely affected. 
 
Of interest therefore is how the French yield gap (French long-rate minus French short-
rate) behaved relative to the comparable Swiss yield gap (Swiss long-rate minus Swiss 
short-rate). Switzerland is taken as the “base” country because our interest is in how 
military-political events in Europe in the months from March 1935 to the abandonment of 
the gold standard by the French in September 1936, may have impacted French financial 
markets.  As explained earlier, Switzerland is used as the base country on the assumption 
that its financial markets would have been less concerned with events across the border in 
Germany, than investors would have been in France.  Simply, Switzerland was much less 
affected than was France by German military and political events, and nor did 
Switzerland face a foreign policy debacle – as France did when Italy invaded Abyssinia. 
This is our asymmetric military-political threat hypothesis. 
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 The five countries are France, Italy, Germany, the UK and the USA.  The data period is 1973-1994. 
18
 The effect on real interests of an adverse shock to expected real economy activity can be simply modeled 
as a leftward shift in the IS curve in ISLM space. 
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Figure 2 shows time series of French-Swiss short-term and long-term interest rate 
differentials.  It is apparent that from about late-1934 and especially spring 1935, that 
French short-term interest rates rose relative to Swiss rates, while at the same time French 
long-term interest rates fell relative to Swiss long-term rates. 
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Figure 2: French minus Swiss monthly short- and long-term interest rate differentials 
 
Clearly, at this time there were significant changes in the French and Swiss yield curves.  
Figure 3 indicates the extent of the relative shifts in yield curves.19 
 
                     
19
 The time series in figure 3 is calculated using the following interest rates     
    (French long – French short) -  (Swiss long - Swiss short) 
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FRENCH YIELD CURVE MINUS SWISS YIELD CURVE
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Figure 3: French yield gap minus Swiss yield gap: 1928(5) to 1936 (12) 
 
From November 1930 to June 1932 the French yield gap was steeper than the Swiss 
(positive segment of figure 3), and this may be taken to indicate relatively good economic 
conditions in France. However, the yield gap difference turns negative in August 1933 – 
and was to remain so to the end of our data period in December 1936, as French short 
rates rose relative to Swiss short rates, and French relative long rates moved downwards.  
 
What interpretation can be put on the behavior of the respective yield gaps? The time 
series in figure 3 fluctuated between positive and negative from the beginning of our data 
period in May 1928 to November 1934, but the differences in the respective yield gaps 
are never so large as in the period concurrent will military-political events in Germany. 
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Beginning in December 1934 the yield curve inversion moves more strongly negative 
than it had done before. This last decisive yield curve inversion indicates weakness in 
French financial markets and real economy relative to Swiss. Thus, the relative rise in the 
French short rate (figure 4) indicates a lack of trust in French short-term assets. The 
contemporaneous French long rate falling relative to Swiss long rate can be taken as a 
sign of expected weakness in the French real economy - French long rates falling because 
the real sector is reducing its borrowing and spending (relative to the Swiss). On this 
interpretation, from early-1935 onward French short-term markets were weakening 
relative to Swiss while the French real economy was expected to weaken (again relative 
to the Swiss).  
 
What was the cause of the inversion of the relative yield gap? As we noted in the 
previous section, Germany introduced conscription in March 1935 and reoccupied the 
Rhineland a year later. All of this aimed at France, with Switzerland remaining a safe 
haven. This is the internal inconsistency interpretation of what caused the gold bloc to 
end in September 1936 is different compared with the standard external inconsistency 
argument - that the members were fed up with the depression that they were bringing on 
themselves. We don’t doubt the external inconsistency argument but we do think that we 
have established that internal inconsistency problems were also causal factors.  
 
The yield gap picture is similar when comparing France and the Netherlands.  Thus, 
figure 4 shows French minus Dutch short and long interest differentials from 1933(3) to 
 23
1936(12).20 And Figure 5 shows the French yield gap minus that of the Netherlands. The 
relative flattening of the French yield gap, in this case from November 1935, is again 
apparent. 
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Figure 4: French minus Dutch short- and long-term interest rate differentials  
 
                     
20
 The shorter period for Dutch data compared with that of France or Switzerland is due to the Netherland 
Bank temporarily publishing relevant interest rate data quarterly rather than monthly in the middle of our 
data period. The French interest rate data is as defined above.  That of the Netherlands is the private 
discount rate as proxying for Dutch short-term interest rates, and government 2.5%-3% irredeemable bonds 
for long-rates. 
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Figure 5: French yield gap minus Swiss yield gap: 1933(3) to 1936(12) 
 
Section 5: Post devaluation capital flows 
Following the currency devaluations of September 1936 and the tripartite agreement to 
stabilize the foreign exchanges between France, the UK and the US (in short order joined 
by Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium), it can be argued that capital outflows from 
the former gold bloc members would reverse themselves as investors repatriated capital 
from abroad in order to take their profits. However, if German remilitarization was a 
factor alarming wealth holders in equal measure in each of the gold bloc members, it is 
entirely possible that capital placed abroad would not return. In fact, in the final quarter 
of 1936, the international bullion and specie balances of the Netherlands and Switzerland 
(as well as Belgium which had re-pegged to gold following its devaluation of March-
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April 1935) were in surplus as flight capital began to be repatriated to these countries 
(League of Nations, various issues)21. However, the bullion and specie balance of France 
remained strongly negative, signifying that net capital outflow continued despite the 
French devaluation. The juxtaposition of the behavior of these capital flows lends further 
support to the hypothesis that German remilitarization did indeed have an asymmetric 
effect on the gold bloc members, with, as hypothesized, France being the more adversely 
affected.  
 
Comments at about this time in central bank annual reports also support the asymmetric 
military-political shock hypothesis. Thus, the Federal Reserve Bulletin for December 
1936 noted that following currency devaluations by the former gold bloc countries in 
September of that year that “uncertainties abroad continue and gold bloc balances in the 
United States have been little reduced since September” (Bulletin, December page 938). 
What gold did return was primarily from London. Uncertainties in France were more 
severe than in the other former gold bloc countries because, as the Annual Report of the 
Netherlands Bank, 1937-38, noted, France was the only one of the six main gold-holding 
countries to lose monetary gold during 1937.22  The other former gold bloc countries, 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium, all gained gold that year. The value of gold held 
by the Netherland Bank increasing enormously, by 59 percent, in the year to March 31st, 
1938 (page 663)23. Moreover, so strong was the flow of funds to Switzerland in 1937, 
                     
21
 Following the devaluation of the Swiss Franc on 27th September 1936, the Swiss National Bank reported 
that “large amounts of Swiss and foreign gold coins…, as well as gold bullion reappeared at the window of 
the Bank” (Annual Report, 1936, page 321 in Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1937). 
22
 The six main holders of gold at end-1937 with 82 percent of the world’s monetary gold stock were the 
US, the UK, France, Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium (Netherland Bank, page 659).  
23
 Page numbers in this paragraph are those in Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1938. 
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threatening both exchange rate and price level stability, that the Swiss National Bank 
established a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Swiss banks to reduce the “excessive 
volume of foreign deposits held by the banks in Swiss currency” (Swiss National Bank, 
Annual Report).24 As to France, the Netherland Bank Annual Report, 1937-38, said that 
“permanent restoration of confidence in the financial and monetary position of France, 
with a consequent repatriation of French capital and a return flow of gold to France” was 
yet to occur (page 659).   
 
Section 6: Conclusions  
We distinguish two different causes of the abandonment of gold by the gold bloc 
members (France, Netherlands and Switzerland) in September 1936 – the external and 
internal inconsistency hypotheses.  The external inconsistency hypothesis, extant in the 
literature, takes the form of an argument that economic causes – high price levels in the 
gold bloc relative to non-gold bloc countries (such as the US and the UK) exerted 
deflationary pressures in the gold bloc that eventually became intolerable.  In this paper 
we have put forward an alternative internal inconsistency hypothesis – that the gold bloc 
became unworkable because of asymmetric military-political shocks emanating from 
Germany and Italy adversely affecting confidence in the French franc to a greater extent 
than either the Swiss franc or the Dutch gilder.  
 
We find some support for this internal inconsistency hypothesis.  In particular we show 
                     
24
 Page 362 in Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1938. 
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that short-term interest rates rose in France relative to Netherlands, Switzerland and 
Belgium concurrent with military-political events in Germany.  Moreover, at the same 
time, we find that the French yield curve flattened relative to those of both Switzerland 
and the Netherlands – events that we interpret as showing both (relative) declining 
confidence in the French franc and (relative) worsening expected long-run economic 
conditions in France. However, the available data does not allow a researcher to claim 
that either the internal or external inconsistency hypothesis dominates.  Indeed, our 
variance ratio test, indicating a lack of mean reversion in gold bloc currencies – 
something that is inconsistent with systems of pegged exchange rates that are thought in 
financial markets to be secure, lends support to both hypotheses. Thus, we conclude that 
the internal and external inconsistency hypotheses are complementary, and that it would 
be wrong to argue for either one excluding the other. 
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